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Abstract
This paper presents an empirical analysis of the strategic forces shaping U.S.-Mexico trade
relationships and the possibilities of extending the trade agreement to the rest of the Americas. The
paper concludes that constituency interests, party loyalty, the proportion of a state’s population of
Hispanic origin, and the influence of textile-related employment in the state were significant
explanatory factors in the Congressional Fast Track vote that occurred in May of 1991.
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On May 23, 1991, the House of
Representatives voted to reject House Resolution
101 to deny President Bush’s request for a two-year
renewal of “fast track” authority for negotiating
trade agreements with foreign countries. The Senate
assured an extension of fast track authority the next
day by voting to reject Senate Resolution 78 to
disapprove the extension. Fast track allows the
President considerable latitude and flexibility during
the negotiations without Congressional interference
by preventing Congress from amending trade
agreements submitted for its approval. Although the
President may negotiate such agreements without
fast track authority as provided for in the U.S.
Constitution, the Congress must ratify any
agreement reached. For that reason, fast track
authority essentially empowers the Executive
Branch of the U.S. government to negotiate
agreements with foreign powers, Without such
authority, foreign countries would have little
incentive to seriously negotiate with the
representatives of the Executive Branch, knowing
that any agreement reached could and probably
would be radically altered by the U.S. Congress.
The debates prior to and the final outcome of
the House and Senate votes provide insights into
future U.S. trade policy towards countries in Central
and South America. There was considerable debate
on the two resolutions to deny an extension of fast
track authority to the President, Some experts have
suggested that if fast track authority did not affect
negotiations on other international arrangements
such as the General Agreements on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT), the President might have been
denied the authority for negotiating with Mexico
under that authority. Agriculture, organized labor,
and environmental groups were generally against
extension of fast track authority for negotiating with
Mexico while manufacturing, service, and industrial
groups were supportive. The diverse interests and
issues raised during the fast track debate present an
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opportunity to examine the interaction between
political economic factors influencing U.S.
international trade policy making, particularly with
respect to the negotiation of a North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA). This paper attempts to
empirically verify some of the competing
explanations of Congressional voting behavior.
Even though the methodology employed in the
paper is not new, the results from the analysis
should shed some light on the nature of the strategic
forces shaping U.S.-Mexico trade relationships and
the possibilities of extending the trade agreement to
the rest of the Americas. The following section of
the paper describes the variables and hypotheses
tested in the model. Results of the statistical
analysis and conclusions of the paper are then
presented.
Model and Hypotheses
Several models and hypotheses have been
suggested in the literature to explain the voting
behavior of legislators. The unifying theme in the
diverse literature is that a legislator is like any other
utility maximizer who utilizes a set of exogenous
social, economic, and political factors to maximize
a well-defined utility function. It is generally
assumed that the legislator’s objective is to
maximize tenure in office (re-election). The
differences in voting models lie in the choice of the
exogenous social, economic, and political factors
that influence the legislator’s endogenous decisions.
One strand of the literature makes a
distinction between a “general bill” (i.e., one with
no well-defined constituency) and a “specific bill”
(i.e., one directly affecting the wealth of individuals
in a constituency) (Nelson and Silberberg;
Peltzman). In order to promote tenure in office, a
legislator would more likely vote in favor of those
bills that directly influence the wealth of voters in
his or her own constituency. Higgs, on the other
hand, has suggested that a legislator’s own
ideological preferences are important in explaining
voting patterns. Zupan emphasized the political
affiliation of the legislator and used a model to
explain what he called “ticket-splitting”. As he put
it: “To the extent that democratic legislators,
because of their ideology, are more willing to forgo
national policymaking for local benefit-seeking than
their Republican counterparts, rational voters have
an investment incentive to lean (1) Democratic
when casting ballots for individual representatives to
Congress, thereby attempting to secure as large as
possible a share of the total government spending
pie, and (2) Republican when it comes to races for
the Presidency” (p. 253), Along similar lines, Grier,
Munger, and Torrent made a distinction among the
voting patterns of members of the Senate and the
House. They argued that committee membership is
less important in the Senate than the House because
individual Senators have what amounts to a power
to veto a proposal through the use of the filibuster,
a power denied Representatives under House rules.
The more popular analytical approach,
however, has focused on the influence of political
action committees (PACS) or interest groups on
legislators’ voting behavior (Coughlin; Tosini and
ToweC Kau and Rubin). The interest group model
has been applied to voting on agriculture bills and
to the allocation of funding for agricultural research
(Guttman; AbleC Gardnev Peters). These models
treat the legislator as the supplier of legislation and
the interwstgroups as demanders of legislation. The
legislator’s goal is to maximize votes in order to
remain in office while the interest groups compete
for funding on behalf of their group members. The
empirical research in this area generally supports the
basic hypotheses that legislators do indeed respond
to interest group pressures. The study reported in
this paper combines the basic ideas suggested in the
interest group literature with several other
alternative hypotheses to explain the voting patterns
on the U.S,-Mexico free trade agreement.
Following Peltzman, the typical statistical
model employed in empirical studies of voting can
be represented as follows:
y=dM+cN (1)
where y is a dummy equal to one for a “yes”, zero
for a “no” vote; M is a vector of economic
characteristics of a constituency and N is a vector of
non-economic factors. The specific equation
estimated in this paper can be represented as
follows:J. Agr. and Applied Econ., December, 1993 29
Vote, = f(Textile Employmenti, Environmental
Rank~,Labor Unionsi, Party AJjWiation,,
Ideological Orientation,, Hispanic
Population in the State,, PAC,, Tenure,,
e,) (2]
where i is a subscript identifying individual
legislators and e is a random disturbance term, The
rest of the variables and hypotheses examined in
this study are presented below.
Vote
The vote cast by a legislator on either the
House or Senate fast track resolution is the
dependent variable in the model. Vote is measured
as a dichotomous variable. If a legislator voted in
favor of one of the resolutions, a value of zero was
assigned. A value of “1” was assigned if the
legislator voted against one of the resolutions. In
essence, a vote~or one of the resolutions was a vote
against the extension of fast track and, thus, a vote
against negotiating an FTA with Mexico. The
opposite is the case for a vote against one of the
resolutions.
Textile Employment
The textile industry was one of the early
opponents to a free trade agreement with Mexico.
The major concern of textile industry representatives
was the possibility of job losses as a result of
increased imports from Mexico. As the textile
indust~ representatives explained during the
testimony before the House Ways and Means
Committee: “U.S. imports of textile and apparel
products during 1990 amounted to more than 16
billion square meters equivalent, triple the amount
imported in 1980, This trebling of imports has
forced the closing of hundreds of producing
facilities in the United States and the loss of over
400,000 jobs since 1980” (American Textile
Manufacturers Institute). An FTA which eliminates
U.S. tariffs and quantitative restrictions on imports
of textiles was, in effect, unacceptable to the
industry. Legislators from states with high textile
industry employment were hypothesized to be more
likely to vote for disapproval of granting fast track
authority to the President,
Environmental Rank
Environmental groups were opposed to the
granting of fast track authority to the President.
Their argument was that U.S. trade agreements have
historically excluded environmental considerations.
Citing the environmental problems at the U.S.-
Mexico border and the failure of the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to supply
information on their involvement with a U.S.-
Mexico binational commission on the environment,
environmental groups argued that granting fast track
authority to the President would mean that “the door
to public involvement and information” on the FTA
would be closed (Ortman). Environmental group
concerns were measured according to the Hazard
Ranking System (HRS). The HRS ranks states
according to the “relative risks posed by a
hazardous waste site to human health or the
environment” (North Carolina Office of the
Governor), The underlying assumption in using this
measure is that legislators from states with high
environmental rankings are more likely to be
concerned about the environment and, therefore,
would vote in support of environmental group
positions. Thus, legislators from states with high
HRS rankings were hypothesized to be more likely
to vote for disapproval of extending fast track
authority to the President.
Labor Conditions
Labor unions were generally opposed to the
granting of fast track authority to the President.
The United Auto Workers (UAW) and the
American Federation of Labor-Congress of
Industrial organization (AFL/CIO) argued that the
proposed FTA would lead to a loss of American
jobs. They argued that fast track would limit
discussion and debate and was “an effort to
circumscribe the role of the Congress in what will
be a wholesale restructuring of the economy of
North America” (Donahue). The overall
unemployment level in each state was used as a
proxy for the labor concerns. On the other hand,
there were several groups who felt that the proposed
FTA would increase employment and therefore
supported the extension of fast track authority to the
President. The percentage of export-related
employment in the state was used to measure the30 Boadu and Thompson: The Political Economy ofthe U.S.-Mexico Free Trade Agreement
export versus import-competing interests. This
second measure is more specific. Legislators from
states with high general unemployment levels were
hypothesized to be more likely to vote for
disapproval of fast track authority. On the other
hand, legislators from states with high export-related
employment were hypothesized to be more likely to
vote in favor of fast track.
Party Affiliation
The voting literature does not reveal any
consistent patterns of the relationship between
political affiliation and trade policy orientation of
legislators (Baldwin). However, the literature on
Presidential politics shows that Presidents influence
both the legislative agenda (Rivers and Rose) and
the outcome of voting in Congress (Edwards). The
application for extension of fast track authority was
submitted by the President and the Executive
Branch lobbied intensively for its approval. Since
the President is a member of the Republican Party,
a Republican member of Congress was hypothesized
to be more likely to vote for approval of granting
fast track authority to the President than Democrats.
The Ideological Orientation
The ideological orientation of a legislator is
important in explaining the votes cast in support of
or against a trade bill. An ideological orientation
variable was used to capture a legislator’s attitude
towards an open and competitive international trade
environment. The Competitive Enterprise Institute
(CEI) periodically ranks legislators based on their
voting records in support of competitive trade
policies. The ranking is on a scale of zero to 100,
A high score for a legislator means that he or she
votes more in favor of an open and competitive
trade environment. Consequently, legislators with
high CEI scores were hypothesized to be more
likely to vote in favor of extending the fast track
authority of the President.
Hispanic Population in the State
The percentage of a state’s population of
Hispanic origin may be justified as an additional
explanatory variable on two grounds. First, a
legislator’s tenure in office may be direct]y
influenced by the support of the Hispanic population
in his or her state. Secondly, a large Hispanic
population in a state acts to strengthen ties between
the citizens of the state and those from Mexico.
Citizens of the U.S. and Mexico become familiar
with the culture and language of each other’s
country and become more accommodating to each
other’s concerns. Professor Hirschman refers to this
phenomenon as the “civilizing influence of trade”
(Hirschman). Thus, legislators from states with
large Hispanic populations were hypothesized to be
more likely to vote in support of extending fast
track authority to the President.
Political Action Committees
Political Action Committees (PACS) play an
important role in shaping the outcome of voting by
legislators. The various groups (farm, labor, and
the environment) all have PACS. PAC contributions
to a legislator increase the “war chest” and the
ability of the legislator to mount a strong campaign
for votes. These contributions are important
especially given the high cost of modern campaigns.
It is common practice for legislators to receive
campaign contributions from groups with differing
positions on a bill. The common approach in the
existing literature is to aggregate all the
contributions to a legislator without distinguishing
between those PACS in favor of a bill and those
opposed. In the case of the fast track votes which
had a significant number of both supporters and
non-supporters, an aggregated PAC effect is
theoretically indefensible. The PAC variable was
split in two, aggregating those in favor of extending
fast track (PACS for) and those against such
extension (PACS against). A positive relationship
was expected between “PACS for” and “Vote” and
a negative relationship between “PACSagainst” and
“Vote.”
Tenure
Tenure refers to the number of years a
legislator has been a member of the House or
Senate, The length of a legislator’s term in office
represents “experience, tactical parliamentary skills,
political contacts, and simple survival power”
(Grier, Munger, and Torrent). These factors also
enable legislators with long tenure to accumulate
more funds to fight off challengers to their seats. A
legislator with long tenure may be able to cast an
unpopular vote and compensate for it with his or
her record on previous votes. On the other hand,J. Agr. and Applied Econ,, December, 1993 31
where a vote is being taken near an election cycle,
a legislator’s decision may be influenced by his or
her tenure in the Senate. A legislator with a few
years in the House or Senate is more likely to vote
in favor of protectionism since it has short-term
benefits and to vote against free trade with long-
terrn benefits (Tosini and Tower). Thus, it is
hypothesized that there exists a positive relationship
between tenure and the probability of a vote
opposing fast track.
Table 1. Re.wits of Probk Estimation
Results
Data from several secondary sources (table 3)
were used to estimate equation 2, The results for
the vote on fast track in both the House and Senate
generally support the hypotheses posed in the study
(table 1). The chi-square test (~’) shows that the
selected variables reasonably explain the voting
patterns in the House and Senate. The number of
correct predictions was greater than 70 percent in
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a Numbers in parentheses are t-values.
*
= eoeffiaent significant at .01 level (one-tailtest).
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= eoeffiaent significant at .05level (one-tail teat).32 Boadu and Thompson: The Political Economy ofthe U.S.-Mexico Free Trade Agreement
Table 2. Results of Probb Estimation: Text.ik fnduatry Effeu
HOUSE SENATE
Explanatory Derivative Derivative of
Variables Coefficient of Probabdity COeffiaent Probabtity
Textile Employment -o.fKw3** -0.WKKI09 -0.00002” -am
(-1.79) (-3.71)
Party mtion 0.51 0.19 051”” 0.21
(0.93) (1.68)
Ideology 0.02”” 0.037 0.22’ 0.009
(1.64) (3.69)
Hspanic 0.0S” 0.02 0.01* 0.035
Poprdation (2.03) (2,40)
Tenure -0.01 -0.005 -Q.K16 -0.002
(-0.89) (-0.59)
constant -0.57 -022 -0.75” -0.29
(-1.31) (-3.88)
SummaryStatistics
Sample Si 92 365
McFadden R2 0.29 0.26
%R@t 75 77
Predhions
X2 = 34.69 (5 degees of freedom) 1.28.73(5 degrees of freedom)
l = coeffiaent signifhnt at .10 level (one-tail test).
““ = coefficient significant at .05 level (one-tail test).
Table 3. Soorces of Data
Vmiable Source
Hortiadturid Production Coat U-S. DepL of tlmunerce, Bureau of the Census.
Census or Hodcakwf Spialties, AC-87-HOR-1,
VOL4, W&l.
Environmental Rank State Rankings, 1989: Nrxth Cumiina @ice of the
Gowrlor.
Export Employment State R- 1989 Nrxrh CoroIina Ojice of r-he
-or.
Unemployment Rate US. Dept. of Labor, MorrU@ LaborReview,April
WI.
Party Aflifiation Gmgwxswrml Quarredy, May 2S, 1991.
Ideology Competitive Enterprise Institute Ranking. 71re
Almanac of American Polities.
Hispanic Population 7ke Almanac of Anwic4m Politics,1992.
PAC Gmtrihtioos Federal El@ion (lr+loq Federal Candidate
Disclosure Repo~ 1989-90.
Tenure in House/Senate % AhnGwc of Anwieon Pohtics.
Te.stile Employment US. Dept. of L&or, Bureau of Labor Statistic,
Jsdusby WagtSurvey Tem”le Plants,Augrsst1990.
Buk& 2386,September 1991.
Vote Congressional Qtwieriy, May 25, 1991.J. Agr. and Applied Econ,, December, 1993 33
the two models. Collinearity diagnostic tests using
the condition indexes and variance proportions for
the variables in the equations did not reveal any
degenerative multicollinearity problems (Belsley,
Kuh, and Welsch).
The results for the House show that export-
related employment in the state, political action
committees, party affiliation, and a legislator’s
attitude towards a liberal trading environment
(ideology) were statistically significant at the 1%
level of confidence in explaining voting patterns,
The percent of the state’s population of hispanic
ongin, the environmental ranking of the state, and
the number of years spent in the House (tenure)
were statistically significant at the 590 confidence
level in explaining voting patterns. A
Representative from a state with high export-related
employment was more likely to vote in support of
the FTA even though the overall unemployment
level in the state was not statistically significant in
explaining voting patterns. The results also show
that to the extent that trade agreements are seen as
a means of expanding markets for U.S. exports,
Representatives with a free market ideology were
more likely to vote in support of the President.
This last conclusion is further supported by the
highly significant coefficient for party affiliation in
the House model. Republican members of the
House were more likely to vote in favor of the FTA
than Democrats. House members with long tenure
were less likely to vote in support of the ITA.
Representatives from areas with large Hispanic
populations were more likely to vote in favor of the
FTA. According to the statistical results,
environmental concerns may have negatively
influenced the vote on the House resolution,
contrary to the hypothesized effect.
The estimates for the Senate voting model
followed the general pattern of the results of the
House model. Unlike the House, however, voting
patterns in the Senate were significantly explained
by the percentage of the population of Hispanic
origin and the tenure of a senator, Senators from
states with high Hispanic populations or shorter
tenure in the Senate were more likely to vote in
favor of extending fast track authority. Republican
Senators were also more likely to vote in favor of
extending fast track authority.
In order to capture the effect of textile
industry concerns, variables representing the
influence of other PACS were eliminated from both
the House and Senate models and a textile indust~
employment variable was included. Both the Export
Employment and the Unemployment variables were
also removed to avoid the confounding effects of
those variables, Again, the number of correct
predictions was greater than 70%. The chi-square
test (X2) shows that the variables in the two
modified models adequately explain the variation in
voting patterns in both the House and the Senate
(Table 2), Textile labor concerns were statistically
significant in explaining the voting patterns in both
the House (5Y0 confidence level) and Senate (10%
confidence level). The influence of the Hispanic
population was also significant at the 5% level in
both cases. A legislator’s attitude towards a liberal
trade regime was statistically significant at the 570
level in explaining voting patterns in the House and
at the 10% level in explaining voting patterns in the
Senate. Party affiliation was significant only in the
case of the House. Since the fast track vote did not
coincide with an election cycle, tenure in office did
not statistically influence the voting patterns in
either House in this model.
Conclusions
The results from this study show that
constituency interests and party loyalty were
significant in explaining the voting on the fast track
legislation. The proportion of a state’s population
of Hispanic origin and the influence of textile-
related employment in the state were also significant
explanatory factors of the vote. Beyond these
factors, no consistent pattern of the House and
Senate vote was discernible, The study points to a
need for a closer examination of the political
economic factors influencing U.S. trade policy
decisions aimed at countries in Central and South
America.34 Boadu and Thompson: The Political Economy of the U.S.-Mexico Free Trade Agreement
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